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**Letter: Lafayette McLaws to Isaac R. Pennypacker,
May 20, 1888**

Lafayette McLaws

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Savannah Georgia


May 20. 1888.

J. R. Remington
Editor Phila Weekly Recs

Dear Sir

What is the matter with the document I sent, relative to the Maryland Campaign of 1862? I have nothing from you relative to it, nor does this ever has been rec'd. I take it for granted these "Politics," on the war now being carried on, between the parties respectively, "Protection for Protection's Sake," and "Protection incident to Revenue," deserves so much attention that the first one, is a very small matter in comparison.

But the Campaign now on foot, is as much of a war as was the one called "The War of the Rebellion" - the home Armies enlisted on each side, which go as ordered by their respective leaders, with as little idea of the men's a demerit

of the questions daily at issue, as did our
Army's in the field - You practice all the
arts of strategy, make false alarms to
conceal the real one, have the same
mantle as regular army is here in yellow,
supplies of ammunition and provisions
and arms, and in all things you act
as if it was real war, excepting, that you
do not kill with the sword, nor with
gunpowder, in the beginning - but
the devastation is nevertheless just as great,
and the conqueror can do little for the
defeated, he comes, and does the miserable
General - 

In my paper I aimed to prove by quotations
from documents officially published - and
after due consideration by Gen. Wallack Commander
in Chief, of the question. "Should ^{all} the troops now
in Harper's Ferry be ordered to the Maryland
heights". This on 5th S^r, 1862 - he submitted
it for the action of Gen. Wool who commanded
the Department in which Harper's Ferry was
included - and Gen. Wool made Miles
hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity,

by this order, he deprived Col. Niles of all discretion
 in the matter & he was to defend Harper's
 Ferry, and every other position was subordinated
 to it - By occupying, the heights he most
 certainly could not have prevented Genl.
 Jackson from occupying the town - In
 illustrations, Read what was done at Fredericksburg
 when Burnside occupied the heights on the
 opposite side of the Rappahannock, neither a
 number more numerous army, and under
 much more favorable circumstances - The
 Army then had no effect against the occupation
 of the town - not one foot being abandoned
 because of the big fire -

It also seems to show them in Oberlin in a hys-
 teria, Col. Niles did hold the town & on
 May Day "to the last extremity", because the
 universal testimony was & is in the Official Pub-
 lications "that the troops could not have
 withstood an assault" at any date
 he held it long enough, to have made Genl.
 McClellan or Gen. Franklin, to have moved

the Corps, so as to have enabled them to have
attacked Gen Lee's Scatter & forces, in detail
each by largely superior bodies of men.
Nor the opportunity to do this was
given, and our most glorious advantage
of, but was lost by inaction!

I also observed, or attempted it - that at Shiloh every portion of the Confederate force was
bagged - their tremendous losses, in each
and every Command, as compared with
the numbers they had in the battle, show
that there was no man in the army,
- whereas the soldiers I quote show there
in the Reserve under Price, did not lose
1500 men, & in Franks Corp the
losses were so small, that we are authoris'd
to day, that they were not heavily
engaged, & might be looked on as reserve
forces. And this Reserve command was
less than the Confederate, and in
line at any one time - Our Reckoned loss
alone, one after another, to at once be
ordered into the fight.

Sothern & Read as if the Southern state
continued - and every opportunity
which many would have taken
advantage of was lost.

It requires few quotations from official
reports to make this credible.
But it also requires more, full extracts
to make it credible, that the Miles
did not know a man with him
, who plotted against the surrender
of Harper's Ferry, a coup d'état at
the Harper's Ferry, an assault.

For the above reasons, and because I know
that public opinion is not in accord
with her views, I have written. I thought
it best to make large quotations from
official publications, so that the public,
~~or~~ the large majority of them who read,
who cannot get the information for themselves
- may form their own opinions, from
official data given them;
But if you think these men references

to sufficient to change public opinion
as I think it must be changed, if
we really are seeking the truth.
I am anxious to have my article
and endeavour to conform to your
views.

Very respectfully
Yours truly
L M^o Hailey